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THERAPEUTIC MDMA (ECSTASY) & THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: A CLOUDY PAST & A HOPEFUL FUTURE
Donald David Lewis
There is something very special about illicit drugs. If they don't always make
the drug user behave irrationally, they certainly cause many non-users to behave
that way.1
INTRODUCTION
The debate over the legalization of drugs in the United States has been a
core issue for well over a century.2 Within this debate, the most intriguing
issues arise when the medical community clashes with the government and le-
gal system regarding whether or not a drug should be legalized for therapeutic
purposes. The debate with the loudest voice to date is over medicinal mari-
juana, however there is another drug, ecstasy3, whose proponents are pressing
for its legalization. Advocates of MDMA are mostly physicians who champion
its therapeutic value as an adjunct to psychotherapy.4 Their opponents are the
federal government, led by the Drug Enforcement Agency, who permanently
banned ecstasy in 1988 by placing it in the most restrictive schedule, Sched-
ule I, of the Controlled Substances Act5, determining that MDMA lacked a
currently accepted medical use and safety, and possessed a high potential for
abuse. The Schedule I categorization is paramount because it results in a sit-
1Lester Grinspoon & James B. Bakalar, Marihuana, the Forbidden Medicine, at xi (1997).
2See Nicole Dogwill, The Burning Question: How Will The United States Deal With the
Medical-Marijuana Debate?, 1998 Det. C.L. Mich. St. U. L. Rev. 247 (1998).
3\Ecstasy" is the most commonly used nickname for MDMA, which is the
acronym for the chemical structure that bears the structural conguration of 3,4-
methylenedioxymethamphetamine. Ecstasy and MDMA are used interchangeably in medical
and legal literature and will be used interchangeably in this paper.
4See Lester Grinspoon and James B. Bakalar, Can Drugs Be Used to Enhance the Psy-
chotherapeutic Process?, American Journal of Psychotherapy, (1986) (hereinafter Grinspoon
and Bakaklar).
521 U.S.C. xx 801-848 (1994).
1uation of extremely limited ability to use MDMA in research and an inability
to prescribe ecstasy for medical use.6 The rigid and narrow research exception7
creates an immense obstacle for physicians trying to conduct research in order
to validate their claims regarding the therapeutic value of MDMA. The problem
is not inherent in the regulations themselves but in the fact that the FDA can
act arbitrarily regarding the approval of research with Schedule I drugs. FDA
risk/benet calculations used to evaluate the safety of studies in human subjects
can be heavily skewed toward exaggerating risk and ignoring benet, with the
decision to place a research proposal on Clinical Hold virtually impossible to
appeal outside of the FDA. In the past (mid-1960s to 1989), FDA blocked all
psychedelic research, with some outrageous examples from the 1980's in which
MDMA research was placed on Clinical Hold. Since 1989, when the FDA reorga-
nized and formed the Pilot Drug Evaluation Sta, with the notable exception of
the brief period from 1997 to mid-1999 when Dr. Cynthia McCormick, the Food
and Drug Administration's (\FDA") Director of Anesthetics, Critical Care and
Addiction Products, blocked Dr. Charles Grob's proposal for MDMA research,
psychedelic research and medical marijuana research have been approached in a
fair and balanced manner. This shift was due to internal FDA policies, with the
same set of regulations as in the previous decades. Advocates of ecstasy would
claim the government acted and continues to act \irrationally" with regards
to the Schedule I placement of MDMA. I would agree. Recently however, the
621 U.S.C. x 812(b)(1) (1994).
721 U.S.C. x 823 (1994). Schedule II-V substances are only available through a physician's
prescription whereas Schedule I substances are prohibited from distribution with a narrow
exception made for research purposes. See id.
2government appears to be lessening its previously irrational stance concerning
ecstasy.
This Paper will present a comprehensive review of the evolution of MDMA
including the historical, legal and medical issues. Part I will present the history
of ecstasy prior to its criminalization in 1986. Part II will analyze the legal
issues and proceedings that resulted in MDMA's Schedule I placement. Part III
will discuss recent clinical studies on ecstasy. Part IV will present several anec-
dotal reports from patients who have successfully used MDMA therapeutically.
Part V will discuss the future prospects for MDMA research and will conclude
that the societal and political concerns that have so hindered research into the
therapeutic benets of MDMA are beginning to crumble and that although
the government has acted \irrationally" in the past with regards to MDMA's
potential as a therapeutic adjunct there is hope for the future.
I. HISTORY OF MDMA PRIOR TO CRIMI-
NALIZATION
MDMA was synthesized in 1912 and patented in 1914 by Merck, a pharma-
ceutical company.8 A common present day misconception is that MDMA was
created as an \appetite suppressant", however the reality is ecstasy was a pre-
cursor agent possessing properties deemed to contain primary constitutents for
8See Grinspoon and Bakalar, supra note 4 at 399.
3therapeutically active compounds.9 Merck's decision not to market ecstasy re-
sulted in the drug being largely ignored until 1953 when MDMA was used in a
series of animal studies, supported by the US Army, the results of which were
not declassied and published until 1973.10 The studies were designed to deter-
mine the dose at which half the animals died, called LD 50 studies for the lethal
dose at which 50% of the test animals die. LD 50 Studies are used to measure
toxicity and hence the toxicity of MDMA was a forgone conclusion, the only
unknown was the dose.
The primary signs of human consumption of ecstasy for therapeutic and non-
therapeutic use was in the early 1970's.11 From the 1970's through the 1980's
MDMA was used as an adjunct to psychotherapy by psychiatrists and other
therapists in the United States and Europe. While there were strong sugges-
tions that ecstasy could be helpful in the therapeutic process12, the reports of
therapeutic results were anecdotal, unpublished and unveried.13 A primary
and prophetic reason for the lack of published results was the fear of ecstasy
advocates that drawing attention to MDMA would result in its criminalization
despite the lack of evidence of harm.
The major obstacles for advocates of MDMA as a therapeutic device began
9Hardman H., Haavik C., and Seevers M., \Relationship of the Structure of Mescaline and
Seven Analogs to Toxicity and Behavior in Five Species of Laboratory Animals", Toxicology
and Applied Pharmacology 25, 299-309 (1973).
10See id.
11Grinspoon and Bakalar, supra note 4, at 399.
12See Richard S. Cohen, The Love Drug: Marching to the Beat of Ecstasy (1988) at 8
(citing to Gallagher, W., \MDMA: Is there ever justiable reason for getting high?", Discover
(1986) 7:34. (Psychiatrists reported that a single MDMA-assisted therapy session could be as
helpful as six months or more of conventional psychotherapy.)
13See id.
4to form as careless recreational use of the drug began to increase. \The very
properties that suggested MDMA might be therapeutically useful - its capacity
to diminish anxiety and depression and promote easy emotional communication
- may also create a danger of unconstructive use."14 Exacerbating this prob-
lem were the early media accounts in the mid-1980's which sensationalized and
\advertised" the euphoric qualities of MDMA. 15 The increased media atten-
tion and recreational use of ecstasy was highly unfortunate for those sincerely
searching for the therapeutic uses of MDMA. Recognizing the dichotomous use
of MDMA, as a therapeutic adjunct in the medical eld and as a recreational
drug used in some, but certainly not all, cases irresponsibly by thrillseekers
is incredibly important in understanding the legal history surrounding ecstasy.
Beginning with the Nixon Administration and the federal governments antago-
nism regarding legitimate medical uses for marijuana, it became clear that the
government strongly wished to prohibit and discourage recreational drug use.16
This \war on drugs" climate continued through the Reagan Administration,
and with the political climate as such in the 1980's it was inevitable that law
enforcement and government ocials would intervene to eliminate the expand-
ing recreational use of ecstasy which would also result in the criminalization of
MDMA's use therapeutically.
14Grinspoon and Bakalar, supra note 4, at 399.
15Marsha Rosenbaum and Rick Doblin, The Drug Legalization Debate: \Why MDMA
Should Not have Been Made Illegal." (1991) at 12 (\The popular media loved MDMA.
They loved the name \Ecstasy"... And they wrote glowing reports about it in nearly every
popular publication, including Newsweek, Time, and the Washington Post. This was not the
rst time the media helped to advertise a \new" drug.").
16See Lauretta Higgins Wolfson, A Quality of Mercy: The Struggle of the Aids-Aicted to
Use Marijuana as Medicine, 22 Thomas Jeesrson L. Rev. 1, 10 (1999).
5II. THE CRIMINALIZATION OF MDMA: LEGAL
ISSUES AND PROCEEDINGS
Wary of the expanding recreational use of ecstasy17, in January of 1984 the
Drug Enforcement Agency (\DEA") prepared a document entitled \Schedule
I18 Control Recommendations under the Controlled Substances Act (\CSA")19
for (MDMA)."20 The CSA was enacted by Congress in 1970 to combat the
problem of illicit drug use in the United States. The Act placed all controlled
substances into ve categories, called schedules. Table 1 contains the entire list
of CSA classications and category criteria for the dierent schedules (Schedule
I - Schedule V).
Table 1. Controlled Substances Act Classications
Schedule I a. The drug or other substance has a high potential for
abuse.
b. The drug or other substance has no currently accepted
medical use in treatment in the United States.
c. There is a lack of accepted medical use for safety of
the drug or other substance under medical supervision.
Schedule II a. The drug or other substance has a high potential for
abuse.
b. The drug or other substance has a currently accepted
medical use in treatment in the United States or a cur-
rently accepted medical use with severe restrictions.
c. Abuse of the drug or other substances may lead to
severe physical or psychological dependence.
17Conversation with Rick Doblin, MAPS Founder (May 12, 2000). (\In January 1984 the
DEA had not yet heard anything at all about possible neurotoxicity. That didn't happen until
a spring, 1985 Phil Donahue television show on MDMA during which Dr. Schuster mentioned
the preliminary ndings of Dr. Ricuarte. Mr. Gene Haslip of the DEA was also a guest
on the same show and realized that Dr. Ricuarte's research could help justify emergency
scheduling.")
1821 U.S.C. x 812(b)(1)(1994).
1921 U.S.C. x 801-848 (1994).
20Grinspoon, M.D. v. Drug Enforcement Administration, 828 F.2d 881, 883 (1st Cir. 1987).
6Schedule III a. The drug or other substance has a potential for abuse
less than the drugs or other substances in schedules I and
II.
b. The drug or other substance has a currently accepted
medical use in treatment in the United States.
c. Abuse of the drug or other substance may lead to
moderate physical dependence or high psychological de-
pendence.
Schedule IV a. The drug or other substance has a low potential for
abuse relative to the drugs or other substances in schedule
III.
b. The drug or other substance has a currently accepted
medical use in treatment in the United States.
c. Abuse of the drug or other substance may lead to
limited physical or psychological relative to the drugs or
other substances in schedule III.
Schedule V a. The drug or other substance has low potential for abuse
relative to the drugs or other substances in schedule IV.
b. The drug or other substance has a currently accepted
medical use in treatment in the United States.
c. Abuse of the drug or other substance may lead to
limited physical or psychological dependence relative to
the drugs or other substances in schedule IV.
In March of 1984, the DEA recommendation was submitted to the Assistant
Secretary for Health of the Department of Health and Human Services (\HHS")
for an HHS recommendation as to whether or not MDMA should be controlled.21
The HHS evaluation was conducted by Dr. Charles Tocus, Chief of the Drug
Abuse Sta of the FDA and his research found of an absence of any reference
to MDMA in FDA les. Upon reviewing the information contained in the
DEA control recommendation and applying the requisite eight-factor analysis22
(Table 2) for drug scheduling Dr. Tocus agreed that MDMA be placed in
Schedule I.23
21See id.
2221 U.S.C. x 811(c)(1994).
23Grinspoon, 828 F.2d at 883.
7Table 2: DEA's Eight-Factor Drug Scheduling Analysis
(1) [The drug's] actual or relative potential for abuse.
(2) Scientic evidence of its pharmacological eect, if known
(3) The state of current scientic knowledge regarding the drug or other
substance.
(4) Its history and current pattern of abuse.
(5) The scope, duration, and signicance of abuse.
(6) What, if any, risk there is to public health.
(7) Its psychic or physiological dependence liability.
(8) Whether the substance is an immediate precursor of a substance
already controlled under this subchapter.
The Schedule I recommendation of the DEA required all three Schedule I
criteria be met. Most notably a Schedule I placement would meant that ecstasy
did not have any accepted medical use in the United States. Unbeknownst to
the DEA at this early stage in the debate was widespread support of MDMA
in the psychiatric community and hence the DEA was surprised by the strong
opposition to the Schedule I recommendation.24 The stage was set for a battle
between the federal government spearheaded by the DEA and those in the
psychiatric community who advocated MDMA as a therapeutic drug.
As a result of a request for a hearing led in August, 1984 by advocates
for the medical use of MDMA, in November 1984, Administrative Law Judge
(\ALJ"), Francis L. Young, was asked by the Administrator of the DEA, John
Lawn, to conduct hearings, gather factual evidence, and expert opinion and
24Jerome Beck and Marsha Rosenbaum, Pursuit of Ecstasy: The MDMA Experience
(1994) at 20 (citing to Adler, J., \Getting High on Ecstasy", Newsweek at 96, (1985), April
16. (\The government's surprise at the therapists' reaction was evidenced by a DEA pharma-
cologist's statement that they `had no idea psychiatrists were using it."').
8report to the Administrator at the conclusion of the proceedings as to what
he felt would be the most appropriate scheduling of MDMA.25 The hearings
were scheduled for the summer and fall of 1985.26 From the prospective of the
proponents of MDMA, the delegation of the MDMA scheduling matter to an
ALJ had to be viewed as a positive as they would have a chance to present
detailed evidence of its therapeutic benets and medical usefulness and the
scheduling of MDMA was postponed until the conclusion of the hearings.
Despite the positive prospects with regards to an administrative law hear-
ing, those in the psychiatric community advocating MDMA suered a setback
as the DEA's claimed fears concerning the possible neurotoxic eects of ec-
stasy use resulted in an emergency scheduling of MDMA, on July 1, 1985, as
the hearings were proceeding.27 The DEA's authority for emergency schedul-
ing was grounded in the Comprehensive Control Act of 1984, an amendment
to the CSA, which provided the attorney general with authority, delegated to
the DEA, to place any substance posing \an imminent hazard to public safety"
into Schedule I while the nal scheduling process was ongoing.28 (Interestingly,
the emergency scheduling was subsequently challenged and rejected since the
Attorney General had not formally delegated authority to the Director of the
DEA.)29 The DEA's claimed justication for an emergency scheduling rested on
a then-unpublished study associating high dosage administration of MDA (3,4-
25See Cohen, supra note 12, at 4.
26See Beck and Rosenbaum, supra note 24, at 21.
27Grinspoon, 828 F.2d at 884 n.4.
2821 U.S.C. 811(h)(1) (1994).
29Kane, J. 1986 Memorandum and Opinion. Case No. 86-CR-153 In the United States
District Court For The District of Colorado. Pees and Mcneill, Defendants, October 1.
9methylenedioxyamphetamine), a chemical compound highly similar to MDMA,
in rats with damage to nerve terminals which use serotonin as a neurotrans-
mitter.30 While the DEA presented the MDA studies as their rationale behind
the emergency scheduling, the ALJ presented various ndings of fact drawing
distinctions between the two chemical compounds31. It should also be noted
that assuming the two compounds were indeed identical, which again they were
not, relying on such animal studies is questionable at best, as evidenced by an
article from a paper co-authored by a DEA witness questioning the ecacy of
extrapolating to humans the results of animal testing.32 Hence the more proba-
ble reason was the governments wish to immediately halt the rapidly expanding
recreational use of the drug.33 Whatever the true rationale behind the emer-
gency scheduling, the eect was negative for ecstasy's psychiatric advocates and
severely hindered the chance of any further research into the drug's therapeutic
potential.34
30See Beck and Rosenbaum, supra note 24, at 21 (citing to Ricuarte, G. et.al, \Hallucino-
genic Amphetamine Selectivity Destroys Brain Serotonin Nerve Terminals," Science 229:986-
988 (1985).
31In the Matter of MDMA Scheduling, Opinion and Recommended Ruling, Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Decisions of Administrative Law Judge, No. 84-48 (1986) (visited
Mar. 31, 2000) at 17-24, ndings of fact 7-84 <http://www.mninter.net/publish/mdma.htm>
32Id. at 21, nding of fact 48 (\The signicance of animal discrimination test ndings as
to abuse potential in humans is far from certain. An Agency witness in this proceeding co-
authored an article, published in 1984, which states that unless a particular compound has
been tested in humans, one cannot be certain that structure-activity relationships will apply
in the clinical situation, i.e., when used in humans. He cautioned that the most common error
found in animal models is the identication of `falsepositives'. That is, the animal models may
indicate a compound to be active, whereas actual testing in humans reveals inactivity. The
article also says that it is clear that no present animal models correlate with the qualitative
dierences between hallucinogens found in humans.")
33See id. at 23, nding of fact 61 (\In the Los Angeles area there was a noticeable increase in
the street use of MDMA shortly before its becoming illegal on July 1, 195. This coincided with
the attention MDMA received in the news media at that time. There was also a signicant
increase in the manufacture of MDMA at that time.... It has been estimated that in all of
1976, 10,000 doses of MDMA were distributed in the United States for street use, as opposed
to 30,000 doses per month in 1985.")
34supra note 7.
10As the hearings continued the integral question still remained as to whether
or not the temporary Schedule I placement of MDMA would become permanent.
Of paramount importance during the hearings was the question of whether or
not ecstasy had a \currently accepted medical use" in the United States.35 For
if MDMA advocates could display that ecstasy did indeed have a \currently
accepted medical use", they could avoid a permanent Schedule I placement of
the drug which would be crippling to future research. Again for a Schedule I
placement all of the following three criteria must be met: 1 { high potential for
abuse; 2 { no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States;
and 3 { lack of accepted medical use for safety under medical supervision.
Before the question of whether or not MDMA had a \currently accepted
medical use" could be denitively answered, the issue of what constituted a
\currently accepted medical use" had to be decided. The ALJ held this ques-
tion to be a legal issue of statutory interpretation hence no ndings of fact were
necessary.36 The DEA asserted that \accepted medical use" was simply deter-
mined by whether or not a drug had received FDA approval under Section 505 of
the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (\FDCA").37 Declaring that
such an interpretation would \greatly simplify the scheduling task of the DEA
sta" Young rejected this assertion. The ALJ cited a litany of FDA statements
regarding the question of the FDA's authority in situations where physicians
had used drugs for purposes the FDA has not approved.38 The most telling of
3521 U.S.C. x(b) (1994).
36MDMA Scheduling, supra note 30, at 4.
3721 U.S.C. x 355 (1994).
38MDMA Scheduling, supra note 30, at 5-7.
11which was the following FDA statement in June 1983: \Although no nal rule
has been issued on this subject, the Agency has continued to apply the principle
set forth in the preamble to the 1972 proposal. In FDA's Drug Bulletin of April
1982, the Agency sought to clarify and reiterate the position that the Act does
not regulate the `practice of medicine"'.39
Despite this long-standing position of the FDA, the position that they lacked
the authority to regulate the \practice of medicine", they introduced at the
hearings a brief pointing to the following statement of the Commissioner of the
FDA in 1982:
Thus, the lack of an approved New Drug Application for a drug substance
leads FDA to nd that a substance lacks \accepted medical use in treatment" for
two reasons. First, if use of the drug is unlawful whenever interstate commerce
is involved, medical use of the drug cannot be classied as accepted. Second, in
the absence of the data necessary for approval of the NDA, the agency has no
basis for concluding that medical use of the drug in treatment can be considered
acceptable by medical standards.40
In response the Commissioner's statement the ALJ stated:
The last quotation ies directly in the face of statutory interpretation by
FDA, issued over a period of eleven years. It represents a complete reversal of
position with no stated basis whatsoever. One can only conclude that, in the
context of the battle over marijuana, FDA temporarily lost sight of its long-
acknowledged lack of statutory authority to regulate the practice of medicine.41
The foregoing actions of the FDA and this statement by ALJ Young, lend
much credence to Dr. Grinspoon's contention that illicit drugs (ecstasy, mari-
juana) cause non-drug users (DEA, FDA) to behave irrationally.
Ultimately, despite the FDA's attempted manipulations, the ALJ concluded
39Id. at 6. (emphasis added).
40Id. at 7.
41Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
12that \accepted medical use in the United States" is not determined by approvals
of the FDA, but rather \by what is actually going on in the health care com-
munity."42
With the issue concerning the proper statutory interpretation of \accepted
medical use" apparently settled, the proponents of ecstasy as a therapeutic drug
had the opportunity to present support for their position. Various physicians
submitted adavits at the hearings citing some of the following as therapeu-
tic benets of MDMA making it an invaluable therapeutic adjunct for a wide
range of problems: 1 - enhances communication; 2 - increases empathy; 3 - fear
reduction.43
The leading advocate of MDMA as an adjunct to psychotherapy was Dr.
George Greer, a Board Certied psychiatrist in New Mexico. Dr. Greer had
been working with MDMA for four and a half years and administered ecstasy
to seventy-six patients.44 His work with MDMA was reviewed by a committee
of his peers.45 Dr. Rick J. Strassman, an Assistant Professor of Psychiatry at
the University of New Mexico School of medicine, was a member of Greer's peer
review committee and stated the following with regards to Dr. Greer's work
using ecstasy as a therapeutic adjunct:
I have reviewed his inclusionary and exclusionary criteria for entrance into
the protocol, informed consent forms, protocol for the administration of MDMA...,
the setting in which sessions occur, his results of follow-up, etc. In my opin-
ion, he has included appropriate safeguards and has not experienced signicant
adverse reactions to this form of treatment, and that all individuals have expe-
42Id. at 11.
43Beck and Rosenbaum, supra note 24, at 22 (citation omitted).
44MDMA Scheduling, supra note 30, at 12.
45Id.
13rienced signicant benet. Therefore, within the standards of practice set forth
by the physicians' community, MDMA has a currently accepted medical use in
the hands of a qualied physician (e.g., Dr. Greer).46
Another member of Dr. Greer's peer review group, Dr. Rodney A. Houghton,
Chief Resident in the Department of Psychiatry at the University of New Mexico
remarked:
In my expert opinion, as one who is familiar with the accepted standards of
psychiatric practice in New Mexico, indeed, having established many of those
standards for ve rural communities and community programs throughout the
state, I believe Dr. Greer's use of MDMA is an accepted and safe medical
practice. I base this opinion not only on my own experience and what I believe
to be acceptable, but also on my conversations with teachers and colleagues
about his work.47
Dr. Will MacHendrie, a Board Certied psychiatrist in New Mexico and a
member of the peer review group stated:
For the past two and one-half years, I have been on the Peer Review Com-
mittee for Dr. George Greer's use of MDMA. In that capacity, I have extensively
reviewed his methodology and his results regarding therapeutic use of MDMA.
I feel that there is denitely a medically accepted use of this drug in treatment,
and that there is acceptable safety for use under medical supervision.48
Despite these overwhelmingly positive testimonials, a problem facing Dr.
Greer and the advocates of MDMA as a therapeutic adjunct was the absence
of \scientically proven" studies and the diculty in conducting such studies
with regards to psychedelic drugs such as MDMA.49 Aware of this obstacle, Dr.
Greer expressed his opinion on the matter in the following way:
I would like to draw a distinction here between a scientically proven eective
46Id. at 12, 13. (emphasis added)
47Id. at 13. (emphasis added)
48Id. (emphasis added)
49Grinspoon and Bakalar, supra note 4, at 396 (\The most serious deciencies in psychedelic
drug studies were absence of controls and inadequate follow-up; in addition, psychedelic drug
eects are so striking that it is dicult to design a double-blind study. No form of psychother-
apy for neurotics has ever been able to justify itself under stringent controls, and psychedelic
drug therapy is no exception.")
14treatment and a medically acceptable treatment. Many treatments, especially
in psychiatry, are accepted by many practitioners, but have not been proven to
be eective to the satisfaction of all scientists in the eld. The ecacy of psy-
chotherapy itself, with its myriad techniques, has yet to be scientically proven
to be eective to the satisfaction of many psychiatrists and psychologists. Yet,
it is considered to be medically accepted treatment. It is my clinical judgment,
and that of my peer review committee, that based on my clinical experience, the
use of MDMA is a medically accepted part of the treatment approach I use.50
Another of the primary issues for the advocates of MDMA was distinguishing
the drug from MDA, the previously mentioned similar chemical compound, due
to the fact that LD50 MDA neurotoxicity studies in rats were integral in the
emergency scheduling of ecstasy. In an eort to achieve this goal Dr. Greer
presented as evidence a personal letter he had received from Dr. Alexander
Shulgin, a renowned researcher and the author of the rst published study on
the eects of MDMA51, providing in-depth detail regarding the dierences that
exist when comparing MDMA to MDA.52 A review of the ALJ's ndings of
fact53 concerning the relationship of MDMA and MDA, one of which states, \the
uncontradicted evidence of the record is that there are qualitative dierences in
humans between MDA and MDMA"54, displays once again that the government
50Cohen, supra note 12, at 28. (emphasis added)
51See Julie Holland, M.D., Transcript of Lindesmith MDMA Seminar, 3/30/00 NYC, at 1
(visited May 18, 2000) <http://www.maps.org/research/mdma/holland0300.html.>
52Id. (citation omitted).
53MDMA Scheduling, supra note 30, at 22, nding of fact 56 (\There are observed dierences
in humans between the eects of MDA and MDMA. Studies other than the one reported by
Shulgin in 1980 have shown MDA to have duration of action in humans of 12 to 15 hours, as
compared to four to six hours for MDMA. MDA has been found to produce a mild cognitive
impairment in humans at 75 mg. dosage level, while MDMA did not impair cognition even
at 200mg. As MDA dosages increase from 75 to 200mg., the eects in humans become
increasingly similar to the eects of LSD, including the presence of visions. As dosages of
MDMA increase from 75 to 200mg., the intensity of the sense of well-being and inner ow of
associations which characterize the experience increase only moderately while the ego functions
remain intact, cognition is unimpaired and visions are notably absent. Large doses of MDA
(200mg) produce signicantly greater disorientation and an up-welling of visual images that
are not characteristic of MDMA in similar dosage range.")
54Id. at 22, nding of fact 58.
15acted irrationally by relying on non-human MDA studies as a claimed basis for
the emergency scheduling of ecstasy.
Ultimately the prevalent feeling among MDMA proponents was that a Sched-
ule III placement would solve the problem of uncontrolled recreational use ec-
stasy, while still allowing for medical treatment and scientic research in con-
trolled environments where the probability of abuse would be minimal.55
The major obstacle facing MDMA advocates, that of scientically unsound
studies lacking in credibility, was embraced by those opposing the use of MDMA
as a therapeutic adjunct. Various research experts testifying for the DEA criti-
cized the anecdotal nature of the MDMA advocates' studies. These views were
most encapsulated by Dr. Joel Kleinmann, a psychiatrist, testied that, \al-
though these reports make interesting reading their lack of scientic design,
methodology and controls makes them scientically unsound."56
In addition to presenting the studies showing MDA's toxicity in non-human
subjects57 and questioning the scientic validity of MDMA advocates' studies,
the government criticized MDMA proponents for failing to follow the proper
55Cohen, supra note 12, at 30.
56Beck and Rosenbaum, supra note 24, at 23 (citing to Kleinman, J., Rebuttal Testimony
on Behalf of Drug Enforcement Administration, United States Department of Justice, Drug
Enforcement Administration Hearings, Docket No. 84-88 (1985).
57Cohen, supra note 12, at 32 (citation omitted) (\Dr. Lewis Seiden also testied on behalf
of the government Dr. Seiden's adavit included comparisons of MDMA to several other
compounds, particularly MDA. Based on the eects that MDA had on rats following excessive
administered doses, he hypothesized that MDMA would have similar, or perhaps, the same
neurotoxic eects on other animal species and would pose potential hazards to humans as
well.")
16procedures58 in experimenting and researching with a new drug.59 Referring
back to the history of MDMA, facilitates recognizing why this argument is un-
fair with regards to ecstasy. The issue is one of economic incentive as alluded
to by the ALJ.60 Since MDMA was already patented in 1914, putting it eec-
tively into the public domain, any company could produce and market ecstasy
under approved conditions. In order to obtain FDA approval for marketing, a
pharmaceutical company would have to invest substantial capital in research.
The incentives of such a course of action are minimal, as another company could
simply market MDMA after FDA approval with minimal investigation and ex-
penditure. The DEA's failure to at least recognize this \special" circumstance
and subsequent claim that there is no \accepted medical use" due to a lack
of FDA approval is once again a demonstration of its irrational behavior with
respect to MDMA.
On May 22, 1986 the ALJ, having heard 33 witnesses and received 95 exhibits
into evidence, recommended a Schedule III placement of the drug.61 Again, for
a Schedule I placement all three of the criteria have to be met. Francis Young's
opinion concluded that not only had all three not been met, but that none of the
three had been met. That MDMA did have a \currently accepted medical use
5821 C.F.R. x 312.34(a) (1999). (Drugs studied in clinical trials are called investigational
new drugs (\IND"). Sponsors wishing to conduct a clinical trial to test a new drug must
submit IND applications to the FDA.)
59Cohen, supra note 12, at 32 (\Dr. Seiden also explained that when studies are performed
on drugs, they should be performed in a systematic and well-controlled manner, as is usually
done under an Investigational Drug Permit.")
60MDMA Scheduling, supra note 30, at 7 (\The fact no one has sought approval does not
necessarily mean that no one is using the drug and that such use is not accepted by the
profession. There are very real economic factors eecting whether an New Drug Application
is sought for a drug.")
61Id. at 28.
17for treatment in the United State's, and \accepted use for safety under medical
supervision", and that a \high potential for abuse" had not been established
by the record.62 MDMA advocates had won the battle. With a Schedule III
placement they would easily be able to continue research and investigation con-
cerning the therapeutic value of MDMA. Unfortunately for MDMA advocates
who had won the battle, the \war on drugs" and more importantly the war
concerning ecstasy was far from over.
Following a thorough review of the record the DEA Administrator refused to
accept the recommendation of the ALJ and on November 13, 1986 issued a nal
ruling placing MDMA on Schedule I.63 In reaching his decision, the Administra-
tor found that MDMA met all three criteria of Schedule I. The Administrator
disagreed with the ALJ with regards to the authority of the FDA to regulate
the \practice of medicine". Specically, the Administrator held that the phrase
\currently accepted medical use" in treatment in the United States meant that
the FDA has evaluated the substance for safety and approved it for interstate
marketing in the United States."64 Using this as the basis for \accepted medical
use" the Administrator further reasoned that because no new drug application
(\NDA") or Investigational New Drug Permit (\IND") had been approved by
the FDA for interstate marketing of ecstasy that MDMA could not be lawfully
marketed and did not have a \currently accepted medical use in treatment in
the United States."65 Hence, despite the multitude and weight of the evidence
62Id. at 27.
63See Grinspoon, 828 F.2d at 884.
64See id.
65See id.
18presented by the ALJ of the FDA's long-standing position not to regulate the
\practice of medicine", the DEA as they did with the issue of medicinal mar-
ijuana, completely reversed course without a clearly stated rationale, resulting
in MDMA's permanent placement into Schedule I.
On March 3, 1987, Lester Grinspoon, a Harvard Medical School professor
and one of the staunchest supporters of MDMA as therapeutic adjunct, appealed
the Administrator's nal ruling placing ecstasy in Schedule I. Grinspoon's con-
cern, the most prevalent concern of MDMA advocates was that a Schedule I
control would eectively foreclose research on the therapeutic uses of MDMA.66
Most relevantly, Grinspoon's challenge was that the Administrator had applied
the wrong legal standards for \currently accepted medical use in the United
States".67
The Fifth Circuit's review of the Administrator's interpretation of \accepted
medical use" was done following the guidelines set out by the Supreme Court
in Chevron.68 The two-step Chevron analysis entails the following:
1 - Whether Congress had directly spoken to the precise question at issue.
If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court,
as well as the agency, must give eect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress; 2 - If... the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construc-
tion on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative
interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specic issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based
upon a permissible construction of the statute.69
66Id. at 882.
67Id.
68Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
69Grinspoon, 828 F.2d at 885.
19Employing a Chevron analysis with regards to \accepted medical use", the
Court held that, while it was undisputed that Congress had not directly spoken
to the proper interpretation of this criteria for Schedule I placement, the Court
was not compelled to proceed to the deferential second step of the Chevron
analysis.70 The Court supported this proposition by citing to the following
footnote in the Chevron opinion: \If a court, employing traditional tools of
statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise
question at issue, that intention is law and must be given eect."71
After conducting a detailed review of the statutory language and structure
regarding Schedule I the Court found it \unlikely that substituting the lack
of FDA interstate marketing approval for the statutory requirements that a
substance lack both an `accepted medical use' and `accepted safety for use...
under supervision' is consistent with the intent of Congress in enacting the
CSA."72
Of particular interest when reviewing the Court's detailed analysis of the
arguments pertaining to the statutory language and structure of the CSA is
the Fifth Circuit's specic attention to the issue of MDMA advocates failure to
obtain an IND or NDA. Stating that the language and structure of the CSA and
FDCA are helpful in determining whether the Administrator's interpretation is
reective of congressional intent, the Court presented the following argument:
The CSA clearly provides that a substance may not be placed in Schedule I
70Id.
71Id at 884 (citation omitted).
72Id. at 888.
20unless it lacks both a `currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United
States' and `accepted safety for use...under medical supervision.' The FDCA
on the other hand, provides that a substance may fail to obtain FDA interstate
marketing approval for any of seven specic reasons.73 Although approval may
be withheld because the substance lacks both `safety',74 and `ecacy' for a
particular use,75 it is equally possible for a substance to be disapproved for
interstate marketing because it lacks only one of these attributes, or because
the application fails to contain relevant patent information,76 or even because
the labeling proposed for the drug `is false or misleading in any particular.'77 78
Reasoning that the FDCA does not even allude to the term \medical use"
and pointing out the \plain" possibility that a substance with an \accepted
medical use may fail to obtain interstate marketing approval, the court found,
as did ALJ Young, that the absence of FDA approval is not a foundation for
determining that a substance has no \accepted medical use."79
Further refuting the DEA's assertion that FDA approval was required for a
drug to have an \accepted medical use" the Fifth Circuit pointed out that un-
like the CSA scheduling restrictions, the FDCA interstate marketing provisions
do not apply to drugs manufactured and marketed wholly intrastate.80 Once
again echoing ALJ Young, the Court asserted that an already patented drug
such as MDMA lacks the potential to be exploited commercially, and that such
exploitation \is irrelevant to one who, like (Dr.) Grinspoon, seeks only to do
research."81
7321 U.S.C. x 355(d)(1)-(7).
7421 U.S.C. x 355(d)(2).
7521 U.S.C. x 355(d)(5).
7621 U.S.C. x 355(d)(6).
7721 U.S.C. x 355(d)(7).




21The lack of commercial incentive and the language of the CSA and FDA
resulted in a \tentative" conclusion by the Fifth Circuit that an absence of FDA
approval does not preclude the possibility of a substance having an \accepted
medical use."82
The Fifth Circuit continued its Chevron analysis by reviewing legislative
history and subsequent legislation to determine whether or not they supported
their \tentative" conclusion. The Court strongly rejected both of the Admin-
istrator's arguments purporting to support his construction of the statutory
language and was extremely scathing in so doing. The Administrator presented
the following passage from the 1968 House Committee Report83: \Under Reor-
ganization Plan No. 1 of 1968 a Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs has
been established in the Department of Justice to regulate all these drugs... to
prevent diversion from legitimate channels. Safety and ecacy will continue to
be regulated under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act by HHS."84 The
Administrator continued that the above led to the proposition that, \Congress
clearly intended that the `safety and ecacy' of narcotic and dangerous drugs
(e.g., whether such drugs are acceptable for medical use and safe for such use)
be determined by HHS under the FDCA."85 The Fifth Circuit objected to the
Administrator's conclusion, stating that his parenthetical comment - \equating
a nding of `safety and ecacy' by the FDA with a nding of `accepted medical
use' and `accepted safety for use under medical supervision' - (was) totally un-
82Id.
83H.R.Rep. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
84Grinspoon, 828 F.2d 888 (citation omitted).
85Id. (citation omitted).
22supported by the House Committee."86 The Court continued \we are loath to
accept such a disingenuous argument."87 Ultimately the Fifth Circuit's rebuke
of the Administrator's stated position, particularly the \totally unsupported"
language, sounds quite similar to ALJ Young questioning the FDA's reversal of
an eleven-year stance against their authority to regulate medicine in the face
of medical marijuana, and his \no stated basis whatsoever" language. Once
again, the government's irrational behavior in the face of an illicit drug had
been clearly exposed.
Having refuted the Administrator's legislative history arguments in support
of his construction of the statutory language, the Fifth Circuit looked next to the
Administrator's arguments concerning subsequent legislation, and found these
arguments to \weaken, not strengthen, the position espoused by the Adminis-
trator in (the) litigation."88
The Administrator's rst argument pointed to the 1984 \emergency schedul-
ing" amendment to the CSA. He claimed that since the provision did not allow
for expedited scheduling in cases where the FDA has permitted the substance to
be marketed in interstate commerce it followed that this standard, rather than
the typical Schedule I criteria, should be relied on in all cases.89 However, the
court rejected this position stating this simplistic criteria was needed in cases
where it would be \necessary to avoid an imminent hazard to public safety,"90
86Id. (emphasis added)
87Id. (emphasis added)
88Id. at 889. (emphasis added)
89Id.
9021 U.S.C. x 811(h)(1) (1994).
23as opposed to the case of MDMA, and the \general run of cases", where the use
of such \shorthand methods" would not be appropriate.91
The second argument referred to a 1986 amendment to the CSA, the Con-
trolled Substances Analogue Act.92 Similar to his rst argument the Adminis-
trator claimed that since excluded from the scope of the amendments controls
was any substance for which there is an approved IND or NDA, that Congress
intended this lack of FDA approval standard should be relied on in all cases.93
However, once again the Fifth Circuit distinguished the unique nature of cases
involving analogues intended for human consumption from nonanalogues and
held this \shorthand method" to be contrary to Congressional intent in general
cases.94
The nal argument asserted by the Administrator concerned Congress, in
1984, placing a drug with an \accepted medical use" in Schedule I. The Ad-
ministrator pointed to language in a House Committee Report95 stating that
the DEA \does not have the authority to impose Schedule I controls on a drug
which has been approved by FDA for medical use."96 The Administrator ad-
vanced the position that the above displayed Congress' approval of the notion
that a substance could not have an \accepted medical use" unless the FDA has
91Grinspoon, 828 F.2d at 882.
9221 U.S.C. xx 802(32)(A), 813 (this amendment denes a \controlled substance analogue"
as a substance having a chemical structure and eect on the central nervous system substan-
tially similar to that of a Schedule I or II controlled drug).
93Grinspoon, 828 F.2d at 889.
94Id.
95H.R. Rep. No. 534, 98th Cong., 2d. Sess. 4 (1984).
96Grinspoon, 828 F.2d at 890.
24already approved it for interstate marketing.97 The Court, using basic logic,
easily rejected this argument stating that although FDA approval is sucient
to prove a substance has an \accepted medical use", it simply does not follow
that the absence of FDA approval is evidence that a substance has no \accepted
medical use."98
Ultimately, as recognized by the Fifth Circuit, general legal principles of
equity and process would be greatly minimized if one were to accept the con-
struction of the CSA put forth by the Administrator. To simply conclude that
a substance has no \accepted medical use" on the basis of the substance not
having obtained approval for marketing would also be wholly unfair. From a
policy standpoint, administrative hearings such as the MDMA hearings and the
opportunity they present for medical professionals to establish an \accepted
medical use" for a drug would become obsolete. Recognizing this the Fifth
Circuit stated, \(administrative hearings) would be reduced to an empty for-
mality and, for participants like Dr. Grinspoon, would amount to an exercise in
futility".99 Supporting this reasoning, the Court revisited the Administrator's
arguments concerning the \emergency scheduling" and \controlled substance
analogue" provisions of the CSA pointing out that neither requires a hearing
prior to regulatory action and that both serve as \stop-gap measures to be em-
ployed pending a nal scheduling determination by the DEA, following a full





25not one requiring a \stop-gap" approach, and to forego any presentation from
medical practitioners as to whether or not MDMA has an \accepted medical
use", would not only be irrational, but would violate basic principles of pro-
cess and fairness. As the Court noted, \Our review of the legislative sources
below also convinces us that the Administrator's interpretation is unreasonable
and would be invalid even under the (deferential) second prong of the Chevron
test."101
Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit vacated the Administrator's determination that
ecstasy should be placed in Schedule I and remanded the issue of whether or
not MDMA had an \accepted medical use" for further consideration, with the
instructions that the absence of FDA interstate marketing approval did not
provide sucient evidence to support the conclusion that MDMA did not have
an \accepted medical use."102
With the determination that a lack of FDA interstate marketing approval
did not preclude a substance from having an \accepted medical use" the ques-
tion remained open as to what standard should be used in determining whether
or not MDMA had an \accepted medical use." Dr. Grinspoon advanced a po-
sition similar to the position of ALJ Young, that the standard should be based
upon the opinions of the medical community.103 Dr. Grinspoon presented,
the testimony of two representatives of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs (\BNDD"), the DEA's predecessor, to support his claim. The statements,
101Id at 885 n. 6. (emphasis added)
102Id. at 891.
103Id.
26which were also presented by ALJ Young in support of his position concerning
the standard for \accepted medical use", were made during consideration of
the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970. Michael
R. Sonnenreich, at the time Deputy Chief Counsel of the BNDD, testied that
drugs in Schedule I would \have no medical use as determined by the medi-
cal community".104 Similarly, John Ingersoll, Director of the BNDD, testied
Schedule I drugs would be those that \the medical profession has already deter-
mined to have no legitimate use in the United States."105 However, despite the
overwhelming clarity of these statements, the Fifth Circuit while acknowledging
that they \(tended) to support Dr. Grinspoon's position", rejected this standard
and quoted Supreme Court legal precedent that \statements made to commit-
tees of Congress... are without weight in the interpretation of a statute."106
Ultimately the Court noted the implicit delegation of Congress to the Admin-
istrator to interpret \accepted medical use" under the CSA and the case was
remanded for further consideration with no standard in place and instructions
that the Administrator could not rely on an absence of FDA approval to support
the conclusion that MDMA did not have an \accepted medical use".107
The Fifth Circuit's decision vacating and remanding the Schedule I place-
ment of MDMA resulted in, eective December 22, 1987108, the deletion of ec-
stasy from Schedule I pending the Administrator's reconsideration of the record
104Id. (citation omitted). (emphasis added)
105Id. at 892(citation omitted). (emphasis added)
106Id. (citation omitted).
107Id.
108See Fed. Reg. 2225-02 (1988).
27from the earlier scheduling proceedings and issuance of another nal rule.109
This positive development for MDMA advocates was extremely eeting. Re-
lying solely on the existing hearing record, \specically concluding that it was
complete and had provided all interested parties an opportunity to present ev-
idence and brief the issues", the Administrator issued a nal rule permanently
placing MDMA on Schedule I eective March 23, 1988.110
The failure of the Administrator to hold additional hearings was challenged
in rst the Fifth111 and then the Eleventh Circuit112 and was upheld due the
\completeness of the existing record and the absence of a specic directive in
Grinspoon to schedule additional hearings."113
An analysis of the ndings of fact presented by ALJ Young, his recommen-
dation based on those ndings that MDMA be placed not even in Schedule II,
but Schedule III of the CSA, the Fifth Circuit and ALJ's scathing language
regarding particular arguments advanced by the DEA, results in much skepti-
cism at the blind acceptance of the Administrator's nal placement of MDMA
in Schedule I absent a statement or analysis of the standard employed in the
determination of whether or not ecstasy had an \accepted medical use."
III. MDMA: RESEARCH IN THE POST-SCHEDULING YEARS
The 1988 nal placement of MDMA in Schedule I of the CSA was a devas-
109United States v. Franz, 87 F.3d 440, 445 (11th Cir. 1996).
110Id.
111United States v. Piaget, 915 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1990).
112Franz, 87 F.3d at 445.
113Id.
28tating blow for those advocating MDMA's use as a therapeutic adjunct. The
Schedule I categorization eliminated a physician's ability to prescribe MDMA
for medial use and severely limited the possibilities for future research. In order
for research on Schedule I substance stringent guidelines have to be followed.
Applications from researchers for a DEA Schedule I license, must be preceded
by FDA approval of an IND. Applications must detail the nature and the mo-
tive behind the proposed research, the security measures that would be taken
to protect human subjects, as well as the substances used in conducting such
a research inquiry, DEA Schedule I applications will be placed on hold pend-
ing FDA review and approval of an IND.114 Upon receiving the application the
DEA forwards a copy of the application to the FDA for the purpose of conduct-
ing a medical evaluation before a nal decision is made in conjunction by the
two agencies.115 In practice, this simply constitutes the DEA checking with the
FDA to see if an IND has already been approved. If the application process is
adhered to and the research is approved, the results of the research are reported
to both the FDA and DEA for review. With the eight-factor test (Table 2) ini-
tially relied on in the emergency scheduling of ecstasy having been rejected by
the D.C. Circuit116, the DEA now uses a ve-factor test (Table 3) to determine
whether or not a drug is in \currently accepted medical use".117
Table 3: The DEA'S \New" Five Part Test
114See Dogwill, supra note 2, at 248 (citation omitted).
115Id.
116Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics et al v. DEA, 930 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
117Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics et al v. DEA, 15 F.3d 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
29(1) The drug's chemistry must be known and reproducible.
(2) There must be adequate safety studies.
(3) There must be adequate and well-controlled studies proving ecacy.
(4) The drug must be accepted by qualied experts.
(5) The scientic evidence must be widely available.
After applying the results of the research to the ve-factor test, the authority
to reschedule lays solely at the discretion of the DEA Administrator. The DEA
can independently apply the ve-factor test and reschedule through that route,
but if the FDA independently approves an NDA, the DEA must reschedule the
substance.118 Since the ve-factor test can eectively eliminate anything short
of FDA approval, researchers are forced in practice to go through the FDA.
Hence the future possibility, for MDMA advocates, of a rescheduling of MDMA
out of Schedule I was/is primarily in the hands the government, a government
that had acted irrationally in the past and most probably would continue to in
the future. In short, the future of MDMA as a therapeutic adjunct appeared
quite bleak.
From the foregoing rigid process, and through the various administrative
decisions and legal proceedings beginning in 1984, it became abundantly clear
to medical professionals endorsing the therapeutic benets of MDMA that only
through FDA approved research would ecstasy ever again be legally prescribed
for medical use. Aware of these obstacles, in 1986 Rick Doblin, one of the
primary coordinators of the pro-MDMA contingent, founded a non-prot orga-
nization, the Multidisciplinary Association for Psychedelic Studies (\MAPS"),
118See id.
30and opened a Drug Master File for MDMA with the hopes of proving MDMA's
therapeutic benets through FDA approved protocols.119 Opening a Drug Mas-
ter File is part of one of the required steps for any drug before it can be legit-
imately researched in the United States.120 The le contained data gathered
from FDA required pre-clinical animal toxicity studies and between 1986 and
1988 ve dierent applications for permission to conduct research with MDMA
were submitted to the FDA's Neuropharmalogic Drug Products Division.121
Aware of the DEA's previous criticism's concerning the lack of scientically
sound double-blind studies by MDMA advocates, three of the proposals were
for double-blind controlled trials and submitted from researchers from the es-
teemed medical schools of Harvard, UC San Francisco and U. of New Mexico.122
The two other proposals, were submitted by individual physicians for single case
studies, one for a terminal cancer patient who had been treated successfully for
pain prior to MDMA's criminalization and the other for a patient with unipolar
depression for whom all other available treatments had been unsuccessful.123 In
rejecting all ve studies the FDA pointed to the hypothetical risk of functional
consequences of the potential neurotoxicity of ecstasy. The MDMA advocates,
all too familiar with \irrational" actions of the FDA and DEA during the pre-
vious administrative and legal proceedings concerning MDMA, believed that
the risk/benet rationale presented by the FDA was disingenuous and that the
119Rick Doblin, The Struggle to Conduct Research Into the Therapeutic Use of MDMA, at





31true reason for the rejection of the studies was an \underlying culture prejudice
against medical research with drugs that were criminalized and on one or more
FDA ocials' personal opposition to human research with psychedelics."124 Ad-
vocates pointed out that concerns regarding the neurotoxicity of MDMA were
unproven as studies failed to link MDMA with behavioral and functional con-
sequences and further, that a similar hysteria was generated in the 1960's when
it was claimed that LSD damaged chromosomes, similarly deterring research,
and later it was proved that the LSD \damage" had no clinically signicant
eect.125 Hence, once again, the FDA, without a solid rationale to support
its actions stunted any eorts to further research on the possible therapeutic
benets of MDMA.
A review of the post-scheduling research concerning the potential neu-
rotoxicity of MDMA lends support to the advocates' of ecstasy assertions that
the government has acted irrationally with regards to the drug. Because of
MDMA's illegal status and the FDA's refusal to approve research proposals
such as the ve above, it has been virtually impossible to study ecstasy's ef-
fects upon human behavior using the traditional double-blind placebo-controlled
methodology.126 Another issue is that the subjective eects of MDMA make
it virtually impossible to conduct and eective double-blind study since most
subjects and researchers can distinguish between MDMA and placebo. Hence
the majority of the relevant information concerning the psychobiological eects
124Id.
125Id.
126A.C. Parrott and J. Lasky, \Ecstasy (MDMA) eects on mood cognition: before, during
and after a Saturday night dance", Psychopharmacology (1998) 139:262.
32of MDMA comes from either studies done on recreational users of the drug
describing their ecstasy experiences127 or animal studies which have provided
much of the information concerning the neurotoxicity of MDMA in rats and
monkeys.128 Studies on recreational users of ecstasy have generally resulted in
the nding of the following positive and negative eects of ecstasy use: (+) - ela-
tion, energeticness, agreeableness, and closeness to others; (-) - neurochemical
depletion, lethargy, depression, memory impairments, and irritability.129 Ani-
mal studies have shown that MDMA can lead to serotonegic neurodegeneration,
in the hippocampus, which is important in memory functioning and other brain
areas, which lead to the suggestion that the memory impairments in humans
may reect serotonergic neurodegeneration.130 The FDA's reliance on studies
such as these to thwart the further investigation into the possible therapeutic
benets of MDMA is completely unfounded in a multitude of ways. The studies
concerning recreational ecstasy users are severely limited as a general matter
for two reasons. The rst is that the subjects of these studies are recreational
users of the drug, as opposed to users of the drug in controlled clinical settings,
and in the majority of the studies contain subjects who are rst, polydrug users
and/or second, have admittedly used MDMA a minimum of twenty times and
frequently over one hundred times or more. The initial problem with the con-
clusion that the possibility of neurotoxic eects in these recreational users would
result in the same for those in clinical settings is that these people have abused
127Id. (citations omitted).
128Id. (citations omitted).
129Id. at 262 (citations omitted).
130Id. (citations omitted).
33the drug, and in some cases abused other drugs, and taken ecstasy in extremely
signicantly higher doses than one would in a clinical setting. In short, there is
absolutely no control over drug administration as there would be in a clinical
setting.131 The second and more telling problem is that along with a lack of
conrmation of the dosage of ecstasy there is no objective conrmation of the
purity of the ecstasy the subjects have taken.132 Tablets illegally sold as ecstasy
contain MDA, MDEA (3,4-methylenedioxy-ethylamphetamine), or mixtures of
a range of other compounds (e.g. caeine, ephedrine, selegiline, amphetamine,
ketamine, LSD).133 Hence, in many cases, the recreational \ecstasy" users may
not even have ingested MDMA. As for the animal studies any assumptions made
about humans regarding such studies are tenuous at best.134 Especially in the
present case where doses administered to the animals are far greater than the
doses that would ever be administered to a human in a clinically controlled set-
ting. In short, by relying on animal studies and data from abusers of ecstasy,
who may not have even ingested pure MDMA, the government has clearly failed
to provided an adequate basis for making the claim that MDMA administered
in a controlled clinical setting would have neurotoxic eects that are of any
clinical signicance.
For a more technical understanding of the irrationality of the government
relying on MDMA studies on recreational drug users to support their \fear" of
131Michael John Morgan, \Memory Decits Associated with Recreational Use of Ecstasy
(MDMA)", Psychopharmacology (1999) 141:35.
132Id.
133Id. (citing to Saunders, N. \Ecstasy and the Dance Culture" (1995); Wol K. et. al.
Contents of \ecstasy", Lancet 356 : 1100-1101 (1995).
134See supra note 31.
34the possibility of neurotoxic eects in clinically controlled settings the following
excerpt from a summary of the recent (8/30/99 - 9/1/99) MAPS international
scientic conference is illustrative:
The most important new data about MDMA neurotoxicity
was
presented by Dr. Franz Vollenweider, University of Zuerich.... Dr. Vollenwei-
der's team and Dr. Ricuarte's's team at Johns Hopkins are the only groups in
the world using PET scans to measure serotonin uptake sites. However, there is
a crucial dierence between the methodology of the two groups. Dr. Vollenwei-
der studies the eects of actual administration of pure MDMA to MDMA-naive
subjects. Dr. Ricuarte does not administer MDMA but studies people with
extensive use of Ecstasy, which is sometimes MDMA and sometimes not, fre-
quently taken in rave environments.... Dr. Vollenweider's study directly relates
to determining the risk to research subjects in studies examining the therapeutic
use of MDMA, where one or several doses will be administered to MDMA-naive
patients. Dr. Ricuarte's studies in polydrug users who have taken MDMA 75
to thousands of times are valuable because this sort of study is most likely to
show reductions in serotonin nerve terminals, since subjects have such a high
exposure to MDMA. However, this study is of less relevance to understanding
the risks of exposure to a few doses of MDMA in a clinical research context.135
Also presented by Rick Doblin at the MAPS conference were the recent
ndings of Dr. Lew Seiden, the same Lew Seiden who oered testimony in
support of the DEA's reliance on animal studies in the original scheduling of
MDMA136. Doblin summarized:
Lew Seiden, Ph.D., University of Chicago, presented data from animal re-
search that showed conclusively that serotonin reductions are related to core
body temperature, with higher ambient temperatures producing hypothermia
which makes one vulnerable to serotonin reductions. This research calls into
question risk assessments for clinical research subjects based on data from rave-
goers who take MDMA in high-ambient temperatures, exercise vigorously, and
135Rick Doblin, Clinical Research with MDMA and MDE A MAPS'
Conference: Dead Sea Israel, at 5-6 (visited Mar. 31, 2000)
<http://www.maps.org/news-letters/v09n4/09402dob.html>.
136See supra note 56.
35sometimes do not consume sucient uids. In contrast, clinical research con-
texts involve the administration of MDMA in temperature-controlled settings,
to people who are resting in bed and supplied with uids. This data about the
importance of ambient temperatures requires a revision of the understanding of
the mechanisms of MDMA-related neurotoxicity.
In addition after a presentation of Dr. Vollenweider's and Dr. Seiden's nd-
ings, as well as the ndings of other medical professionals, which were correctly
focused on the safety of the administration of MDMA in clinically controlled
settings, the summary of the ndings concluded as follows:
At present, the only evidence in humans for functional consequences from
regular exposure rates to MDMA is from data that are not clinically signicant
and are not conclusively proven to be due to MDMA. The minimal ndings
in these studies of Ecstasy users is reassuring. In summary, there are no data
showing that one or few doses of MDMA in a clinical research context bear
substantial risks for long-term harms from possible neurotoxicity.
IV. MDMA-ASSISTED THERAPY - PROMISING ANECDOTES
Despite the positive results of the MAPS conference, the strength of the
methodological arguments, and of the ndings regarding neurotoxicity, MDMA
advocates are still lacking \scientically valid" evidence of any therapeutic ben-
ets of MDMA. Prior, to presenting the prospects for FDA approval regard-
ing such studies, I will present some primary anecdotal evidence which ecstasy
advocates nd so extremely promising. Evidence that has motivated MDMA
advocates such as those in MAPS to independently fund their research for 15
years in an attempt to conduct FDA-approved clinical trials and have MDMA
removed from Schedule I.
The following is an excerpt from an account of a woman therapist in the
Midwest who gave her husband, Dick, a dose of MDMA to relieve his pain when
36he was terminally ill with cancer:
What makes non-narcotic help so appealing is that the patient is conscious
and communicating with those he loves. This is so important for both patient
and loved ones. Dick had a beautiful death of acceptance and serenity. He died
with the loving support of me and his son. It made a bond between us that
sustained me through the heavy months that followed. Now that four years
have passed, the pain is less, but my gratitude for giving Dick his MDMA is as
strong and sharp as ever.137
An excerpt from the account of the daughter of a 92 year old man, George, to
whom a dose of ecstasy was administered to relieve the emotional and physical
pain following a stroke and imminent death:
There is no way I can say how grateful am for MDMA for opening up a
way to help George with his emotional and physical pain. It was the rst time
this sti necked, fearful old man had let go. Nobody had ever before seen that
hidden, beautiful, lovely soul.138
Excerpts from the personal account from a thirty-three year old woman who
had serious problems with depression for 12 years and took a dose of MDMA
as a catalyst for healing her fears and depression:
137Rick Doblin, An Account from a woman therapist in the Midwest who gave her husband
MDMA to relieve his pain when he was terminally ill with cancer, (visited Mar. 31, 2000)
<http://www.maps.org/research/mdma/cancerpain.html>.
138Rick Doblin, Alleviation of Emotional Pain in an Elderly Man, (visited Mar. 3l, 2000)
<http://www.maps.org/research/mdma/pain1.html>
37I am thirty three years old. I have had serious problems with depression
since I graduated from college in 1983. I have been hospitalized twice and have
been on various psychoactive medications between the years 1986 and 1995.... I
have been through four psychiatrists and two psychologists in addition to several
therapists and doctors in the hospitals. My symptoms have ranged from clinical
depression to high anxiety to having delusions....
I believe what happens is the MDMA lessens or eliminates your experience
of fear, thus you are able to delve into areas that you might normally not go
into. When you're in these area, you can stay longer. You are not afraid of
your own feelings and thoughts and you are not afraid to express them. You are
not afraid of other peoples ideas or suggestions. Its been said so many times in
so many dierent ways but it is still profound: Fear is man's greatest foe (and
perhaps his only real foe.)
We talked late into the night. By 4 or 5AM, my friend was beginning to
fall asleep and I was feeling like I might be able to sleep. That was the end
of the actual drug experience. The after-eects are still being experienced. A
week and a half after the MDMA episode I saw my therapist. I did not tell him
that I had taken an illegal drug. I knew he would strongly disapprove. About
20 minutes into the session, he seemed a little disconcerted. He said something
about how he had been gone for two weeks and instead of me getting worse
while he was away, which would have been normal for me, I seemed better. He
said that there was some new quality about me that he couldn't quite put his
nger on, but I seemed stronger. It was hard for me not to share with him. I
38only commented that I had evolved.
[Describing the long-term eects]
My therapist told me two weeks ago that I don't seem to be very open with
him anymore and maybe that was a sign that I didn't need him and that I am
strong enough to go \solo" (for the rst time in 11 years). I am still open with
my boyfriend and my close friends. I feel less alone than I've ever felt in my life.
Excerpts from a series of letters to MAPS of the daughter of a 59 year-old
man who died of terminal pancreatic cancer. Prior to his death the daughter
and father experienced two MDMA sessions:
I was able to have two successful MDMA sessions with him which allowed
for some major breakthroughs and permitted him to enjoy a few precious hours
of pain-free \quality time" with his family.... In looking back, I nd that the
two MDMA sessions we had were two of the most joyous memories during his
nal weeks of existence.
[Describing the session]
At that point in his illness, he was having trouble walking by himself, even to
the bathroom, but he asked that I help him outside so he could look at his
beloved garden for the last time....
Long after I would have expected the eects to wear o, Dad was bounding
out of bed on his own to walk slowly back and forth to the bathroom, and was
making jokes and making us laugh well into the night....
Our two sessions will undoubtedly stick out in my memory as time passes and
I can begin to mellow the memories of agony and cherish the ones of quality time
spent together. I wish you continued success in getting the status of MDMA
changed through research, to allow for others to participate in such beautiful
experiences.139
Excerpts of a letter to MAPS from the twenty-eight year old ancee, Sue,
of a twenty-ve year old terminal cancer patient, Shane, relating the eects of
their two MDMA sessions prior to his passing:
139From the Newsletter of the Multidisciplinary Association for Psychedelic Studies, MDMA:
a catalyst for healing my fears and depression, (visited Mar. 31, 2000)
<http://www.maps.org/news-letters/v06n1/06114per.html>.
39I recently lost my ancee, Shane to cancer after a long battle. It has been
trying on those who were close to him. It has also been a very fullling event,
due in part to MDMA sessions we went through to seek to accept his death
and relieve the emotional pain and hardships we encountered as the result of
his terminal illness.
Taking MDMA together was the best decision we could have ever made in
regards to the cancer. We discussed this many times before his death last week.
Shane's very long obituary concluded with a request at the end; in his memory,
in lieu of owers, we asked people to support the MDMA research going on for
people facing cancer....
There is such a need for recognition of this wonderful research and its poten-
tial to change the lives of those facing terminal illness. The spectacular people
ghting the cause need the help of all of us out there to bring it to a positive
light.... Nobody knows if someday they could be facing all that we did. Hope-
fully they never will, but in the event they do, it should be feasible that they
have this readily available to them, unlike how we had to \break the law" to
help our anguish....
It was an unbelievable night that I wish every government ocial could view.
Every person who is skeptical of the legalization of MDMA to help people with
cancer pain needs to view the miraculous events that began to unfold....
This video of our session shows what we deem a miracle. In the rst two
hours, Shane is clearly physically uncomfortable. That diminishes as time passes
until suddenly he is pain-free. I'm not talking the mental/emotional pain that
we knew would be gone; physically he had zero pain.... He even \hammed it up"
for the camera as he virtually jogged towards the kitchen, leaning into the lens
of the camcorder telling the world that he didn't hurt. No amount of morphine
had been able to accomplish this and he had been living for a long time hurting
to a harsh degree....
MDMA allowed us to do that night what our oncologist hadn't been able to
do. To kill the disease entirely... if only for a night....
Cancer took my soul-mate from me physically for the remainder of my life.
Cancer robbed us mentally and emotionally. We were able to ght back and
\kill" the cancer not only for the last night we took MDMA together, but for
the next ve week's that followed before Shane's passing last week....
What I do believe fully and have seen and lived rst hand is that while
MDMA will not cure cancer, it can cure the emotional pain that accompanies
it if used correctly. This entire ght makes me cry more than Shane's passing.
I am appalled that it is not available to those who need it....
In the same token everyone facing terminal cancer should have the feelings
of acceptance brought on by MDMA made available to them when it is so
desperately needed....140
V. CONCLUSIONS AND THE FUTURE OF THERAPEUTIC
140From the Bulletin of the Multidisciplinary Association for Psychedelic Studies, A series
of letters on MDMA and cancer, (visited Mar. 31, 2000)
<http://www.maps.org/news-letters/v09n4/09431sue.html>.
40MDMA
A critical element in our national drug control policy is the federal drug
approval process. This established process for approving medications is based
on the rigorous applications of science, not ideology. Thus, in America, every
potential medication must meet rigorous criteria before it can be sold to the
public or prescribed by doctors. This process protects Americans from dan-
gerous drugs, unproven substances and ineective treatments. It has helped
provide America with medical care that is the envy of the rest of the world.
This process must be preserved. Exempting any potential medication from this
scientic scrutiny undermines the proven system and does a grave disservice to
the public, as it will have neither a tested, rational basis on which to conclude
the benets of a drug outweigh its risk nor the assurance that the product is
accompanied by sucient information to permit its accurate prescription.141
The role of the government in the Schedule I placement of MDMA and the
subsequent limitations on physicians advocating its therapeutic cannot be over-
stated. Through the emergency scheduling, through the rejection of the ALJ's
recommendation, through the acceptance and reliance on questionable studies
in relation to the precise issue, through a series of unsubstantiated and irrational
legal and administrative decisions and statements, and through a reliance on a
\war on drugs" ideology that fails to distinguish between therapeutic legaliza-
tion/use and recreational legalization/use, the federal government, primarily via
the FDA and DEA, have done a \grave disservice to the (American) public"
with regard to therapeutic use MDMA.
An overwhelming amount of evidence presented, especially the anecdotal
evidence, suggests that there are some real therapeutic benets to MDMA.
Riveting anecdotal reports such as these make clear the incredible importance
141Dogwill, supra note 2, at 289, 290 (citing to Letter from Barry McCarey, Drug Policy
Advisor, to Eleanor Holmes Norton (U.S. Representative), Andrew Brimmer (Financial Con-
trol Board Chairman), Lieutenant General Julius Becton (Board of Education Chief Executive
Ocer, Marion Barry (Mayor of Washington D.C.), and Linda Cropp (Acting Chair of Wash-
ington D.C. City Council) (July 22, 1997) <http://www.ncjrs.org/pr72297.html>. (emphases
added).
41of initiating clinical trials into the therapeutic use of MDMA.142 And nally
through the tremendous work of MDMA advocates such as Rick Doblin and
the people of MAPS, it appears as if the government is nally living up to its
\established process" of relying on \science, and not ideology." Specically,
after years of pre-clinical studies and FDA stalling143 , in a teleconference on
June 24, 1999, MDMA advocates, Rick Doblin and terminally ill cancer patients
received wonderful news.144 The incredible cloud that had been hovering over
therapeutic MDMA for over 15 years began to shift and rays of sunshine began
to poke through. During the teleconference with FDA ocials, the MDMA
advocates were told that they no longer had to conduct the rigid and enormously
expensive pre-clinical trials that had been an obstacle for so long, that they
would be permitted to initiate a pilot study145 using MDMA in human cancer
patients and nally have a fair and scientic chance to prove the safety and
ecacy of MDMA. Additionally, in Spain, the world's rst controlled scientic
study of the therapeutic use MDMA will begin, in August 2000. The study,
142From the Newsletter of the Multidisciplinary Association for Psychedelic Studies, Speak-
ing with silence: MDMA in a couple dealing with cancer, (visited Mar. 31, 2000)
<http://www.maps.org/news-letters/v07n4/07405sue.html>.
143Rick Doblin, The Struggle to Conduct Research into the Therapeutic Use of MDMA, at 2
(visited Mar. 31, 2000) <http://www.maps.org/research/mdma/index/html> (\In 1992, FDA
reviewed a MAPS-supported protocol submitted by Dr. Charles Grob... for a study of the
use of MDMA is the treatment of pain, anxiety and depression in cancer patients... FDA
(gave) nal approval for the Phase I safety study on November 5, 1992. The safety study was
completed in 1995... Dr. Grob submitted the rst draft of the protocol for the study of cancer
patients in 1997. Negotiations with FDA moved very slowly, due to initial FDA decisions to
put MDMA psychotherapy research on the slow track to nowhere.")
144Rick Doblin, MDMA Research Permitted After Years of Eort, at 1 (visited Mar. 18,
2000) <http://www.maps.org/research/mdma/0699mdma.html.>
145Id. (\We will be permitted to initiate a pilot study in cancer patients focusing on a
clearly dened clinical end-point... If and when we get information about therapeutic eect
size without producing serious adverse side eects, we will be permitted to initiate a large
scale clinical trial designed to be one of the two `adequate and well controlled' trial necessary
before FDA would approve a drug for marketing.").
42funded by MAPS, will evaluate the eects of MDMA in women suering from
post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of sexual assault.
Science, not ideology. Hope, not futility. Sunshine, not cloudiness. Rationality.
After a 15 year uphill struggle MDMA advocates, with the assistance of the
FDA, are nally getting the opportunity to prove and hopefully share the ecstasy
that is MDMA assisted psychotherapy with those unfortunate individuals so
desperately in need.
43